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One important area of Levinas's Jewish thought consists in his Talmudic read~ 
ings. Over the coUrse of many years, he developed an approach to the reading of 
Talmud that relies, implicitly and explicitly, on various hermeneutical principles. 
A fundamental characteristic of rabbinic reading, according to Levinas, is "ex~ 
creme attention to the Real;' the complexity ofboth human nature and the many 
concrete situations to which human beings must respond. This essay uses one of 
the Talmudic readings as a springboard for an exploration of the hermeneutics 
that are at work in Levinas' approach, including, in this case, his own very real 
relationship to and disappointment with his teacher, Martin Heidegger . 
....~.. " 
Levinas and the Talmud 
At first or even second glance, and certainly to the untrained eye, the Talmud 
appears to be a rather jumbled record of arguments and random comments. 
One of the ways in which Emmanuel Levinas describes its deep inner dynamic 
is the following: 
In itself, this Talmudic text is intellectual struggle and courageous opening unto 
even the most irritating questions. The commentator must carve out a path to­
ward them without letting himself be deceived by what appear to be Byzantine 
discussions. In fact, these discussions conceal an extreme attention to the Real. 
The pages ofthe Talmud, mischievous, laconic in their ironic or dry formulations, 
but in love with the possible, register an oral tradition and a teaching which came 
to be written down accidentally. It is important to bring them back to their life 
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of dialogue or polemic in which multiple, though not arbitrary, meanings arise 
and buzz in each saying. These Talmudic pages seek contradiction and expect of 
a reader freedom, invention, and boldness. l 
We find in this passage several of the characteristics that Levinas ascribes 
to the Talmud: "courageous' opening unto even the most irritating questions"; 
"extreme attention to the Real"; and "multiple, though not arbitrary, meanings:' 
Over many years, Levinas presented readings ofTalmudic passages to the 
Paris gatherings of French Jewish intellectuals.2 His humility before the text is 
one of the characteristics of his reading style. 
My effort to comment starts from the hypothesis that the Talml,1d is not simply 
a compilation. Of that I am persuaded, in spite of appearances to the contrary. 
and I always ascribe my difficulties in discovering this coherence and this pro­
'~1 - ...... found logic of the Talmud tQ-.dtepaL*lty of my means7Perhaps nothing should 
be published under the title of "Jewish thought" for as long as this logiC has not 
, been found.3 
There is an internal logic to the Talmud" but it is always yet to be discovered. 
Each exercise of reading a particular passage may contribute to the ultimate 
discovery of this logic, but in the meantime our readings must remain provi~ 
sional and fragmentary. 
Nevertheless, even in this. tentative reading mode, Levinas assumes that 
"different periods of history can communicate around thinkable meanings" (p. 
5). This is enacted in the redactional style of the Talmud itself, wherein dif­
ferent generations, individuals who could never have actually met each other, 
lEmmanuel Levinas, Nine Talmudic Readings, trans. Annette Aronowicz (Blooming­
ton: Indiana University Press, 1990), pp. 4-5. Parenthetical page numbers refer to this 
volume. 
2Many ofthese Talmudic readings are available in English translation. In addiition to 
Nine Talmudic Readings (cited above), see Beyond the Verse, trans. Gary D. Mole (Bloom~ 
ington: Indiana University Press, 1994); In the Time ofthe Nations, traris. Michael B. Smith 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994); New Talmudic Readings, trans. Richard 
A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1999). For Ltvinas's Talmudic back­
ground,and his role in the Colloque des Intellectuels Juifs de Langue Franlfaise, see Judith 
Friedlander, Vilna on the Seine: Jewish Intellectuals in France Since 1968 (New Haven: Yale 
Univehity Press, 1990). Chapter.5. 
3Quoted in Marc-Alai~ Ouaknin, The Burnt Book: Reading the Talmud, trans. 
Llewellyn Brown (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 149. 
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appear to be in conversation across the page.4 It must also be the operative 
assumption of anyone who claims that an ancient text can continue to speak 
to our contemporary situation. 
Let us begin with an exegesis of an exegesis, namely the talmudic read~ 
ing"Toward the Other;' which Levinas offered to the Colloquium of French~ 
Speaking Jewish Intellectuals in 1963. Its main themes are responsibility, re~ 
pentance, and forgiveness, particularly in relation to Yom Kippur, the Day of 
Atonement. Since Levinas brings his teacher, Heidegger, into the discussion, 
some consideration is given to the so~called "Heidegger Affair" (debates over 
Heidegger's Nazi affiliation and its connection, if any, to his philosophy) as it 
relates to the overall theme of responsibility. This will also provide an oppor~ 
tunity to indicate the fundamental difference between Levinas and Heidegger. 
In connection with this, there will.also .be a b(kfexploration ofanother Jewish 
student of Heidegger, Hans Jonas, whose comments shed additional light on 
the question. Finally, we shall essay some general comments on Levinas' ap~ 
proach to hermeneutics, highlighting along the way connections between his 
approach to reading the Talmud and his approach to philosophy. 
"Toward the Other" 
The reading which Levinas tides "Toward the Other" is based on a severely 
truncated excerpt from the closing passage of Tractate Yoma, a section that 
stretches over several'folio pages.s The tractate as a whole deals with the ritu~ 
als and meaning of Yom Kippur, the most fundamental gesture of which is 
teshuvah, a turning toward other persons as well as toward God-an approach 
which aspires to but does not always achieve full reconciliation. This is implied 
by the tide of Levinas' lesson, "Toward the Other," which discusses a story of a 
failed approach, a "turning toward" that takes a wrong turn. 
In the passage Levinas chooses for this lesson, the Gemara expands on a 
typically brief statement from the Mishnah: 
4Many contemporary writers on the Talmud attribute subtle artistry co the "Stam­
maim;' the final redactors of the Talmud, who are credited with creating this conversational 
effect. See, ror example, Jeffrey 1. Rubenstein. Talmudic Stories: Narrative Art, Compruition. 
and Culture (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1999). pp. 15-2l. 
5The correct page numbers are 85b-87b, not 85a-85h as cited in the Aronowicz vol­
ume; the full discussion actually extends all the way to the end of the tractate, on page 
Shofar • An Interdisciplinary Journal ofJewish Studies 
"Extreme Attention to the Real" • 39 
The transgressions of man toward God are forgiven him by the Day of Atone­
ment; the transgressions against other people are not forgiven him by the Day of 
Atonement if he has not first appeased the other person. 
I 
An example ofwhat Levinas calls the Talmud's "extreme attention to the Real;' 
this passage is a detailed meditation on the importance of peace.;making be­
tween individuals, and examines from many angles both the necessity and the 
difficulty of seeking forgiveness, as well as the necessity and difficulty of offer~ 
ing forgiveness. 
The core narrative of the Gemara's commentary is this: 
Rabbi Isaac has said: "Whoever hurts his neighbor, even through words, must 
a ppease him ... 
. . . Rab once had an altercatiopwith a slaughterer of livestock-The latter 
did not come to him or. tbe eve of Yom Kippur. He then said: I will go to him 
myself to appease him. (On the way) Rab Huna ran across him. He said to him: 
Where is the master going? He answered: To reconcile with so and so. Then, he 
said: Abba is going to commit murder. He went anyway. The slaughterer was 
seated, hammering on an ox head. He raised his eyes and saw him. He said to 
him: Go away, Abba. I have nothing in common with you. As he was hammering 
the head, a bone broke loose, lodged itself in his throat and killed him .... (pp. 
12-13) 
IfI have wronged another, I am obligated to seek reconciliation. Rab (Abba) 
.goes beyond the letter of the law: having been wronged, he do~s not wait but 
rather goes to offer an opportunity for reconciliation. 
The text "also wants to speak to us of the purity which 'can kill;' suggests 
Levinas, "in a mankind as yet unequally evolved, and of the enormity of the 
responsibility which Rab took upon himself in his premature confidence· in 
the humanity of the Other" (p. 23). It seems that his approach to the slaugh~ 
terer .may have caused the latter to hammer even harder on the skull before 
him, resulting in a splinter that causes the slaughterer's death. Such a result is 
even anticipated by Rab Huna, who equates Rab's zeal for reconciliation with 
murder. If I do what I know to be right, am I responsible for an unforeseen 
negative result? Yes, I am. What a complicated, difficult freedom! 
"God is perhaps nothing but this permanent refusal of a history which 
would come to terms with our private tears. Peace does not dwell in a world 
without consolations" (p. 20). Consolations are not the same as justice. Here 
is a hint of the way in which Levinas's Talmudic readings reflect, and perhaps 
inform, his philosophical approach. A disciple of Franz Rosenzweig, Levi­
nas stands against the philosophical attempt to create a complete, totalizing 
system. Here the reality of injustice, despite right intentions, argues against 
any all-inclusive philosophy. Not all injustice is rectified; life cannot be neatly 
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packaged. The messiness of the Real is ethically significant, beyond the conso­
lations of a thought-out philosophy. 
Among the disclaimers at the beginning of Levinas' discussion, perhaps 
the most important is the warning that "one should not think after hearing 
me that the Jewish intellectuals of France now know what the Jewish tradi­
tion thinks of forgiveness" (p. 14). This emphasizes, with a sly wink, that the 
talmudic conversation must remain open-ended, that my interpretation is not 
all-encompassing. Even if I tell you what I think the text is driving at, and 
even ifyou acknowledge the authority of my opinion, there is still always more 
that could be mined from the text (and neither is the Talmud the last word 
in Jewish teaching). We are never finished reading, just as, later, Levinas asks 
rhetorically, "[H)as anyone, in any case, ever finished asking for forgiveness~ ... 
The seeking for forgiveness never.comes to anend. Nothingisever completed" 
(p.24). 
The statement of the Mishnah, which launches the talmudic discussion, 
divides sins into two categories. Transgressions of the individual toward God, 
which we might call ritual sins (desecration of the Sabbath, eating unkosher 
food, etc.) can be atoned for by means of the Day ofAtonement itsel£ Assum­
ing that I have sincerely repented for such transgressions, the coming of the 
day itself wipes the slate clean. However, transgressions committed against an­
other person are not so easily dealt with. God is merciful and eager to forgive 
sins that involve the private individual's ritual failures. But if I have wounded 
another person, I must first rectify that situation. I must turn toward that 
other, ask and receive her forgiveness. Only then does Yom Kippur effect 
atonement. 
The arguments made in the Talmud, even when they speak of God, are 
not about God, are not an effort to describe God. "Religious experience, at 
least for the Talmud, can only be primarily a moral experience" (p. 15). What 
we can know of God comes to us through teachings about values, and the 
themes of sin, repentance, and forgiveness have precisely to do with values. 
The primary term of relationship is the ethical obligation to the other human 
being, so often denoted by Levinas as "the face of the other:'6 Yet despite the 
88a. 
6Elsewhere Levinas writes of the face of the other, which "is alone in translating tran­
scendence. Not to provide the proof of the existence ofGod, but the indispensable circum­
stance of the meaning of that word. of its first statement:' See "The Meaning of Meaning" 
in Outside the Subject, trans. Michael B. Smith (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 
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primacy Levinas gives to the ethical, he opens the argument to a more complex 
understanding of what such an attitude might mean: 
It could be concluded a bit hastily that Judaism values social morality above rit­
ual practices. But the order could also be reversed. The fact that forgiveness tor 
ritual offenses depends only on penitence-and consequently only on us-may 
project a new light on the meaning of ritual practices .... The ritual transgression 
that I want to erase without resorting to the help ofothers would be precisely the 
one that demands all my personality. (pp. 16-17) , 
But is it the day itself, 'a particular moment on the calendar, that is capable 
of putting into ,notion "this total mobilization of oneself" (p. 17)~ No. "One 
must rely on the objective order of the community to obtain this intimacy of 
deliverance" (p. 17). Judaism makes no sense in isolation from others; a Jew~ 
ish hermit would be aconcradiction in rerms.-This line of the argument leads 
Levinas to conclude that "ritual is not external to conscience" (p. 17). This is 
essentially the same insight that he offers in the essay"Ethics and Spirit": 
One cannot. in fact, be a Jew instinctively; one cannot be a Jew without knowing 
it. One must desire good with all one's heart and, at the same time, not simply de­
sire it,on the basis of a naIve impulse of the heart. Both to maintain and to break 
this impulse is pel'haps what constitutes the Jewish ritual. Passion mistrusts its 
pathos, and becomes and re-becomes consciousness! Belonging to Judaism pre­
supposes a ritual and a science. Justice is impossible to the ignorant man. Judaism 
is an extreme, consciousness? 
The preservation of"the sense ofjustice dwelling in the Jewish conscience" (p. 
17)-would that it were always and everywhere as present as Levinas seems 
to think!-is intimately linked to ritual, which in turn depends upon the pres~ 
ence of a community. The ritual and the ethical turn out to be not such sepa~ 
rate categories after all. 
The Heidegger Question 
In Levinas' discussion, the "Heidegger Affair" lurks in the background. "There 
can be no forgiveness that the guilty party has not sought!" (p. 19): I may be 
obligated to be forgiving, but I am not obligated to forgive before being asked. 
Indeed, to forgive prematurely would be to short-circuit the process of teshu­
vah, and to deprive the offender of some necessary inner work. UIt is difficult 
to forgive Heidegger" (p. 25)-':"'especially since he has not asked for forgive­
p.94. 

7Einanuel Levinas, Dlfficult Freedom, trans. Sean Harid (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
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ness. Levinas compares this to "the easy terms promised by free grace" (p. 24). 
(Bonhoeffer would call it "cheap grace:') 
Martin Heidegger is a towering figure in 20th century philosophy. His 
major work, Being and Time (1927), was dedicated to his teacher, Edmund 
Husserl. Yet, when Heidegger, a loyal Nazi in 1933, became the Rector of 
Freiburg University; HusserL a Jew, was forbidden use of the library. (Levinas 
had been a student of both Husserl and Heidegger.) There has been a run­
ning discussion of whether Heidegger's political loyalties and personal moral 
failure were consistent with his philosophical convictions. His Jewish students 
have wrestled with this question in various ways.s Some offered partial de­
fenses, some pleaded with him to express regret. 
Philosophically; Levinas turns away from Heidegger. To oversimplify: 
metaphysics has .to. do with ..bdngs• .ontology. with.,Being, Heidegger rejects 
metaphysics because of its emphasis on beings: 
But if man is to find his way once again into the nearness of Being he must first 
learn to exist in the nameless. In the same way he must recognize the seductions 
of the public realm as well as the impotence of the private. Before he speaks man 
must first let himself be claimed again by Being, taking the risk that under this 
claim he will seldom have much to say. Only thus will the preciousness of its es­
sence be once more bestowed upon the word, and upon man a home for dwelling 
in the truth of Being.9 
Important as Heidegger is to Levinas, Levinas rejects this emphasis on 
Being, calling it unjust because it obscures the face of the other who stands 
before me. Levinas therefore seeks to re-found philosophy on the basis of a 
metaphysics that begins with the other. Hence, "Metaphysics Precedes On­
tology:'l0 Indeed, Levinas sees himself as thinking in opposition to Western 
University Press, 1990), p. 6. Italics in original. 
8See Richard Wolin, Heidegger's Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl Lowith, Hans Jonas, 
and Herbert Marcuse (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2001). Wolin reports that a 
Swiss newspaper raised the question in 1936. Later that year, Karl Lowith raised the ques­
tion directly with Heidegger, who responded that"his partisanship for National Socialism 
lay in the essence of his philosophy:' See pp. 177-78. 
9Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism;' in David Farrell Krell, ed .• Basic Writings 
(San Francisco: Harper. 1977), p.199. 
lOEmmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity (TI), crans. Alphonse Lingis (Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press. 1969), pp. 42-48. This is the heading of a crucial part of 
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thought (for that matter, Heidegger sees himself the same way!), which "con­
sists in understanding being only as the foundation ofbeings:'ll 
Levinas' turn away from Heidegger is already clear in Totality and Infinity 
(1961): 
To affirm the priority of Being over existents is to already decide the essence of 
philosophy; it is to subordinate the relation with someone, who is an existent, 
(the ethical relation) to a relation with the Being of existents, which, impersonal, 
permits the apprehension, the domination of existents (a relationship of know­
ing), subordinates justice to freedom. 12 
Heideggerian "Being" is an abstraction which absorbs the individual into a to­
talizing framework that valorizes freedom over justice. For Levinas, insisting 
that philosophy must begin with the individual who faces me is an "extreme 
attention to the Real." ' 
In March of 1966, Heidegger sent a letter to the editor of Der Spiegel 
which was taken as a "hint" that the philosopher was ready to speak more 
fully about his conduct during the Nazi years. An interview ensued, which 
was not published until after Heidegger's death in 1976.13 The interviewers 
offer Heidegger many opportunities to clarify the record, which he attempts 
to do in several cases. They also offer opportunities to express regret, which he 
consistently (and astonishingly) fails to do. 
Levinas, whose Talmudic reading was offered almost three ytfars before 
the Heidegger interview, and more than twelve years before the interview was 
published, anticipates Heidegger's failure. Levinas is already disappointed in 
his former teacher, who up to that point (1963) had not expressed regret nor 
asked forgiveness. "It is difficult to forgive Rab" (p. 25). But at least, in Rab's 
case, his action could be read as doing the right thing while failing to antici­
pate the negative consequence-we ate not told how he felt afterward. In Hei­
degger's case (lehavdil-forgive the comparison!), he sees the consequences of 
Nazism, he knows his own complicity, yet he refuses to express regret. "One 
can forgive many Germans, but there are some Germans it is difficult to for­
give. It is difficult to forgive Heidegger" (p. 25). This understatement on the 
Section I. 
IILevinas, "Beginning with Heidegger" in God,. Death, and Time, trans. Bettina Bergo 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), p. 122:ltalics in originaL 
12Emanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 45. 
13"Only a God Can Save Us;' trans. Maria P. Alter and John D. Caputo, reprinted in 
Richard Wolin, ed., The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
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part of Levinas is striking." Difficult?!" one wants to say, "impossible!" Perhaps 
"difficult" expresses the regret of the former student, and holds open for an­
other moment the door of hope that Heidegger will yet come clean. But no, 
Rab is deemed guilty because he is brilliant and should have known better. 
And "it is even less possible to forgive Heidegger:' 
A Detour to Hans Jonas 
Hans Jonas, one of Heidegger's Jewish students who fled Germany, offers an­
other critique of Heidegger's thought.Jonas is convinced that Heidegger's phi­
losophy is intimately connected to his Nazi sympathies. Addressing himself to 
Christian theologians who find in Heidegger's philosophical thought a poten­
tially useful tool for theology, Jonas argues that despite Heidegger's appropria­
tion ofJudeo-Christian vocabulary, his orientation is fundamentally pagan. 
This is not merely an accusation of heresy. Jonas sees in Heidegger a 
philosophy fraught with concrete consequences. It includes, for example, an 
emphasis on a paganish notion of fate, the call of German destiny, without 
providing "a norm by which to decide how to answer such calls:'14Jonas points 
out to his theological interlocutors that 
[t ]he real opposite to the Christian and Jewish view is not atheism, which con­
templates a neutral world and thus does not pre-empt divinity for what is not 
divine, but paganism which deifies the world. 15 
And in what one theologian describes as Heidegger's "hauntingly suggestive" 
style, Jonas discovers a further danger: 
May I, a mere nonsaved, but sympathetically caring child of the world, be per­
mitted to pray: God protect theology from the temptation of resorting to haunt­
ing language! ... More important than ... considerations of taste is the specter of 
arbitrariness and anarchy that thus appears. 16 
But perhaps his strongest rebuke comes in the next paragraph, where he 
speaks of 
the seeming, false humility of Heideggds shifting the initiative to Being, so se­
ductive to Christian theologians, but in fact the most enormous hubris in the 
Press, 1993), pp. 91-116. 
14Hans Jonas," Heidegger and Theology," in The Phenomenon ofLife (Chicago: Univer­
sity of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 247. 
15Jonas, "Heidegger and Theology;' p. 249. 
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whole history of thought. For' it is nothing less than the thinker's claiming that 
through him speaks the essence of things itself, and thus the claim to an author­
ity which no thinker should ever claim.!? 
On Jonas' reading, Heidegger not only overcomes the need for hermeneutics, 
but lays the groundwork for a dangerous assertion of absolute authority. 
Jonas and Levinas 
Jonas is very direct in his ~ritique, indeed his accusation, of Heidegger. Levinas 
generally seems to prefer an indirect approach. In at least two places in his es­
say,Jonas comes close to Levinas's thought. Jonas stresses that God is radically 
other: "[TJheology should guard the radical transcendence' of its God, whose 
voice comes not out of being but breaks into the kingdom of being from with­
out."18 And towarQ the eiid of ois essay; Jonas offers a passage thit cotiHhave 
been written by Levinas: 
[I]t is hard to hear man hailed as the shepherd of being when he has just so 
dismally failed to be his brother's keeper. The latter he is meant to be in the 
Bible. But the terrible anonymity ofHeidegger's'~being," illicitly decked out with 
personal characters, blocks out the personal call. Not by the being of another 
person am I grasped, but just by "being"! And my responsive thought is being's 
own event. But called as person by person-fellow beings or God-my response 
will not primarily be thinking but action.!9 
This is consistent with what Jonas has already argued on p. 247:"1 hear 
questions to man as the doer of deeds, not the speaker of words;' which in 
turn echoes an early rabbinic saying: "It is not the midrash (interpretation) 
that is essential, but the action" -which returns us to our consideration 'of the 
Talmud. 
What is Missing? 
Just as a midrashic reading of Scripture requires that we inquire about what is 
missing from the text, so might a reading of the Talmud prompt wonder about 
what the redactor has left out of thediscus~ion. In the case of this excerpt, we 
might ask why Levinas chooses these particular passages to explicate, while 
eliding others. To go beyond the obvious reasons-that he takes the text as 
16Jonas, "Heidegger and Theology;' p. 256. 
!]onas, "Heidegger and Theology;' p. 257. 
18Jonas, "Heidegger and Theology;' p. 248. 
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a springboard for a public discussion within a limited time frame (as he in­
dicates on p. 22), or that these particular passages are sufficient to make the 
point he wishes to make-would be a complicated and time-consuming effort, 
not to be attempted here in full. 
But one small example may suffice. Immediately preceding the story of 
Rab and the slaughterer is a brief statement about a precedent set by Rabbi 
Zera (omitted by Levinas): "When R. Zera had any complaint against any 
man, he would repeatedly pass by him, showing himself to him, so that he 
may come forth to [pacify] him:'20 Rab, in his conduct with the slaughterer, is 
accused by the text of what Levinas calls "premature confidence in the human­
ity of the Other" (p. 23)-a confidence that appears to cause the other's death. 
Rab's student even anticipates a negative outcome. Yet the text, at the same 
time thad! seem& tfI.accuse Rab of a kind of short-sighted, over-zealous piery, 
also includes him in the pious precedent of R. Zera. It takes a positive view of 
R. Zera's practice, aligning it with a reading of a verse from Proverbs: "[G]o, 
humble thyself, and urge thy neighbor" (Prov. 6:3), here read as encouraging 
one to act with humility and initiative in order to make peace.21 Neither R. 
Zera nor Rab is seeking forgiveness in these cases, but rather the opportu­
nity to forgive. Neither is sitting back, arms folded, waiting for the offender 
to come to him. 
If Rab is following the example of R. Zera, as the text implies, why is R. 
Zera right and Rab wrong~ The contrast supports Levinas' contention that 
Rab was somehow rash and premature in his action toward the slaughterer. 
He should have known better. But at the same time, he is extending himself, 
going beyond the "letter of the law;' to offer an opportunity for peacemaking. 
Adding the example of R. Zera actually emphasizes the complexity of the 
situation. Even if, in generaL it is meritorious to extend oneself, and not to in­
sist on the full respect due one's rank, still one who is a sage is also expected to 
exercise sober judgment about the specific situation. Perhaps R. Zera and Rab 
insisted too strenuously on the respect due them on account of their learning. 
We do not know the circumstances of the original altercation. We are led to 
19Jonas, "Heidegger and Theology;' p. 258. 
2°Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Yoma, trans. Leo Jung (London: Soncino Press, 1938), 
p.435. 
21This is not the exact meaning of the passage in its original context, which has more 
to do with extricating oneself from a rash promise, but it is quite in line with the midrashicl 
rabbinic style of reading. The main point is that it is sometimes necessary to humble oneself 
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believe that the slaughterer offended Rab, but we never get a description of the 
argument that led up to the unfortunate outcome. That is precisely an illustra, 
tion ofhow difficult it is to make peace in real life. To do the right thing at the 
wrong time is dangerous. But is it always possible to know in advance? 
A Scriptural Addendum 
Levinas leads us through the talmudic argument ina certain direction, but 
without closing off alternate readings. There are questions which must be 
revisited periodically. As if to emphasize the uneasiness of the text, and its, 
unresolvability, Levinas adds a few pages devoted to a difficult biblical text. It 
relates an incident in which justice is demanded, but cannot be perfectly real, 
ized. The style ofthe Talmud is very different from that of the Bible, but they 
do have in common -an "extreme atferition to the-Real;' a coricErnwTtli concrete 
situations. 
This "coda" is a reflection on 2 Samuel 21,22 in which the Gibeonites de' 

mand the death of Saul's sons, and David complies-a frightening example 

of a situation in which perfect justice is not possible. This is an interesting ar, 

rangem:ent of texts by Levinas; the Gemara does not cite this passage. Levinas 

thus appends to his discussion of Talmud his interpretation of a passage of 

Scripture. We generally think of the Talmud (incorrectly) as a commentary on 

Scripture. Here Levinas uses Scripture as a vehicle to extend his commentary 

'on the Talmud. He finds a passage in 2 Samuel that raises parallel questions of 

justice, reconciliation, and the impossibility of always finding neat endings. 

In Levinas' juxtaposition of texts, we will not reach the satisfaction and 

rest of tidy resolutions. "The Talmud teaches that one cannot force men who 

demand retaliatory justice to grant forgiveness" (p. 28). So, it seems, does the 

Bible teach: "probably all the greatness of what is called the Old Testament 

consists in remaining sensitive to spilled blood" (p. 26). Justice is done, but in 

the process injustice is also done. We are left with "the image of this womah, 

. this mother, this Rizpah Bat Aiah, who for six months watches over the corp' 

ses .. :' (p. 29). Echoes here ofAntigone-it so often seems to be women who 

perform the duty of mourning in the wake of masculine justice. 

Hermeneutical Principles 
Levinas delivered his talmudic readings over many years, arid his hermeneutic 
, i , no doubt evolved somewhat over time. References will be made here to one 
fat the sake of peace. 
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other talmudic reading and to Levinas' own introductory comments, but what 
follows is at best a preliminary list of fifteen hermeneutical principles that 
Levinas applies in his reading ofTalmud. 
1. 	 "Carve out a path toward" the text's "initial thrust:' (pp. 4-5) 
2. 	 "Extricate the universal intentions from the apparent particularism." (p. 
5) 
3. 	 "Different periods of history can communicate around thinkable mean~ 
ings:' (p. 5) 
4. 	 The Talmud is not a mere extension of the Bible. (p. 7) 
5. 	 "The literal meaning, which completely signifies, is not yet the signified. 
The latter is yet to be sought:' (p. 7) 
6. 	 "To sketch the possibility .. :' (p. 9) 
7. 	 "Extricat(e] from this theoiogicallanguage meanings addressing them~ 
selves to reason:' (p. 14) 
8. 	 The text does not offer information about God, but meaning "in and for 
man's life:' This is related to Levinas' understanding of Maimonides' view 
that "all that is said of God in Judaism signifies through human praxis:' (p. 
14) 
9. 	 "Religious experience, at least for the Talmud, can only be primarily a 
moral experience:' (p. 15) 
10. 	 "The reference to a biblical verse does not aim at appealing to authority . 
. . . Rather, the aim is to refer to a context which allQws the level of the 
discussion to be raised and to make one notice the true import of the data 
from which the discussion derives its meaning:' (p. 21) 
11. "Ideas do not become fixed by a process ofconceptualization which would 
extinguish many of the sparks dancing beneath the gaze riveted upon the 
Real. ... Ideas are never separated from the example which both suggests 
and delimits them:' (p. 21) 
12. There is no "correct" hermeneutic 	that uncovers and clarifies the text's 
"original" meaning. "I do not assume that the masters whose discussion 
I am spelling out had a tacit understanding regarding the symbolic value 
of the terms used. I do not possess a key with which to decipher magical 
formulae:' (p. 32) 
13. 	 There is a "permanent dissonance between what the Talmud draws from 
the biblical text and what is found in that text literally:' (p. 39) 
14. 	 "[A]ttempt to translate Talmudic discourse into modern language:' (p. 
39) 
15. 	 Rub the text. (p. 46) "This violence done to words to tear from them the 
secret that time and conventions have covered over with their sedimenta~ 
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tions, a process 'begun as soon as these words appear in the open air of 
history:' (p. 47) 
The Relation between Scripture and Talmud 
Scripturalcitations b~th interrupt and propel the flow ofTalmudic discourse. 

They retain an original meaning which can and does enter into a dialectical 

relationship with subsequent interpretation. 

(T]hese signs-biblical verses, objects, persons, situations, rites-function as 
perfect signs: whatever the modifications that the passage of time introduces 
into their visible texture, they keep their privilege of revealing the same meanings 
or new aspects of these saine meanings. They are thus irreplaceable, perfect. and, 
in !a purely hermeneutical sense, sacred signs, sacred letters, sacred scriptures. 
,tJever does the meaning of these symbols fully dismiss- the Il"diteriality of the 
symbols which suggest it. They always preserve some unexpected capacity for 
. renewing this meaning. Never does the spirit dismiss the letter which revealed 
it. Quite the contrary, the spirit awakens new possibilities of suggestion in the 
letter. (p. 8) 
Commentary does more than comment. The Talmud "sees itself as a sec~ 
ond layer of meanings; critical and fully conscious, it goes back to th~ mean­
ingsof Scripture in a rational spirit" (p. 7). Levinas characterizes this move ,as 
"the spirit wrestling with the letter" (p. 24). At the same time, "the Talmudic 
spirit goes radically beyo~d the letter ofScriptures" (p. 39) to the point where 
there is a "permanent dissonance between what the Talmud draws from the 
. biblical text and what is found in the text literally" (p. 39). 
It is common to refer to a scriptural citation in the Talmud as a "proof­
text;' that is, a scriptural "hook" upon which to hang one's argument. Such 
citations would normatively be thought ofas carrying great weight, and some­
times a talmudic argument hinges on wnether a sage has correctly applied 
such a verse. For example, a halakhic (legal) ruling that'can be shown to be 
"mi-d'oraita"-from theTorah-by means of a scriptural prooftext, generally 
takes precedence over a legal enactment that is "mi-d'rabbanan"-rabbinically 
derived without direct scriptural connection. 
Levinas, however, is not dealing with halakhic passages. By his own ad­
mission, he lirhits his discussions to secti~ns of the Talmud that are primarily 
a~gadic (p. 32). Thus scriptural prooftexts are not our objective: 
The reference toa biblical verse does not aim at appealing to authority.... Rath­
er.the aim is to refer to a context which allows the level of the discussion to be 
raised and to make one notice the true import of the data from which the discus­
sion derives its meaning. (p. 21) 
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The biblical citation is not used to "prove" a point. It may, however, serve as a 
sign that points the reader back to its original context, thus drawing a wider 
set of associations into the conversation. In that case, it is shorthand, a code, 
for an ever-expanding range of possible meanings. 
Connections between Levinas's Philosophy and his Talmudic 
Reading 
We might venture here to draw a structural parallel between the function of 
the scriptural passage in Levinas'sTalmud and the "existent" in Levinas's ethi­
cal philosophy. The existent, the Other, does serve a function-he interrupts 
my freedom and awakens my understanding to the fact that I am perpetually 
and inevitably obligated. Nevertheless, the Other is not simply absorbed into 
tll¥-~philosophical system. Rather, he remains -Other. "Nevel"-.aoes J;h~- spirit. 
dismiss the letter which revealed it:' That might be phrased, in philosophical 
terms, as "Never does Being ( ontology) take precedence over the existent who 
meets me face to face:' (Again, this is precisely where Levinas opposes Hei­
degger philosophically.) 
Similarly, the scriptural citations that are found everywhere in the Talmud 
are, in a strange but important sense, "other" to the Talmudic text. The Talmud 
"wrestles" with Scripture. It goes "radically beyond the letter:' Yet, "[iJts spirit 
was nonetheless formed in the very letters it goes beyond, so as to reestablish, 
despite apparent violences, the permanent meaning within these letters" (pp. 
39-40). Scripture remains Scripture. Scriptural examples have their own re­
ality, and "[iJdeas are never separated from the example which both suggests 
and delimits them" (p. 21). Scripture has its own integrity as revelation, even 
as it sets into motion a struggle of the spirit that will be signified in and by the 
talmudic text. 
Implications for Hermeneutics 
The task of the hermeneut, the talmudic exegete, the teacher, is to rekindle 
the dynamism of the spirit that produced the Talmud. Though her respon­
sibility is to "translate Talmudic discourse into modern language" (p. 39), and 
to "extricate the universal intentions from the apparent particularism" (p. 5), 
these are not tasks that ever reach completion. More important is to release 
the spirit trapped in the text, because ideas should "not become fixed by a pro­
cess of conceptualization which would extinguish many of the sparks dancing 
beneath the gaze riveted upon the Rear (p. 21). 
Annette Aronowicz points out "the capacity of the Talmudic text to judge 
the present" (p. xxv). When Levinas states in his introduction to the first four 
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readings that his goal "is to extricate the universal intentions from the appar­
ent particularism" (p. 5), he might intend several possible meanings: 1) that 
a narrative related about a particular person contains a meaning that can be 
generalized and extended to that person's contemporaries; 2) that a particular 
Jewish story or statement from a particular historical time and locale has uni­
versal implications that apply to Jews in all times and places; 3) that a story or 
statement that happens to be located in a Jewish text has implications for all 
human beings. 
Nevertheless, Levinas does not claim possession of the hermeneutical 
"key:' Indeed, as we have seen, he rejects the notion that there is a "correct" 
hermeneutic that uncovers and clarifies the text's "original" meaning. "I do not 
assume that the masters whose discussion I am spelling out had a tacit under­
.".".•_._~..stand.ing rega~ing the symbolic value oIthe teuns..~ lda..not possess a key 
with which to decipher magical formulae" (p. 32). But even if there were such 
a key, one that could lead back to the "original meaning:' the discussion must 
nevertheless remain open-ended, for "the literal meaning, which completely sig­
nifies, is not yet the signified. The latter is yet to be sought" (p. 7). 
Violence andjof Hermeneutics 
Another talmudic reading hoMs further clues to Levinas's hermeneutic ap­
proach. In "The Temptation of Temptation" Levinas discusses, a 'passage that 
contains a well-known midrash describing the giving of the Torah. Based on 
a kind of double entendre offered by the Hebrew of Exodus 19:17, Rabbi Ab­
dimi imagines that Mt. Sinai was held over the heads of the Israelites: Accept . 
the Torah, or else! Can it be that, having just brought about the liberation 
of Israel, God now forces the Israelites to accept the Torah:' In this partially 
humorous midrash, Levinas discovers a crucial insight, related to the tradition 
(cited in the same talmudic passage) that the Israelites agreed to do the com­
mandments before actually hearing them ("naaseh v'nishma - we shall do and 
we shall hear"). The great temptation, particularly in the West, and especially 
under the influence of philosophy, .is to know everything, even to experience 
everything, before making a decision-and to believe that this is possible. I 
must know all my options, weigh the pros and cons, and only then decide. "The 
temptation of temptation is the temptation ofknowledge" (p. 33). 
This narrative of revelation, hinted at in the Torah and alluded to in Rab­
bi Abdimi's strange reading, is meant, according to Levinas, as a reminder that 
there is a "consent prior to freedom" (p. 37). To what does Levinas refer when 
he says, "In the beginning was violence" (p. 37):' Does he allude to the creation 
of the world, as well as to the giving ofTorah? A little further on, his descrip­
tion of the "Torah received without violence, as it is commonly understood" (p. 
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37), seems to be intended ironically. There is, in fact, no revelation, no inter~ 
pretation, no translation without some violence. 
He also makes a statement that recalls Walter Benjamin. Pausing at the 
description ofRaba "buried in study" and "holding his fingers beneath his foot 
and rubbing it so hard that blood spurted from it;' Levinas comments, "As ifby 
chance, to rub in such a way that blood spurts out is perhaps the way one must 
'rub' the text to arrive at the life it conceals" (p. 46). Benjamin, in a well~known 
passage in the "Theses on the Philosophy of History;' argues that those objects 
and documents that we know as "cultural treasures" are in fact the spoils of 
conquest. 
There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document 
of barbarism. And just as such a document is not free of barbarism, barbarism 
. t~ints also the. manner in which itwas transmitted fmm..one.owner to ~nother.A 
historical materialist therefore dissociates himself from it as far as possible. He 
regards it as his task to brush history against the grain.23 
Neither Raba nor Levinas is, precisely speaking, a historical materialist. Even 
so, they brush these documents-Torah, Talmud-very hard. 
Saying and Said 
Translation is a necessary tool for building peace by building bridges between 
languages, cultures, traditions, nations. Nevertheless, the translation process 
itself involves a kind of violence, a wrenching of a text out of one cultural 
context and depositing it in another. Part of Levinas' project is "to translate 
Talmudic discourse into modern language" (p. 39), which he elsewhere calls 
"Greek" or "philosophical" language. His reading, therefore, involves "ex[ricat~ 
ing from this theological language meanings addressing themselves to reason" 
(p.14). 
For Levinas, as we have come to understand, philosophy begins with eth~ 
ics. This is a principle that governs his talmudic exegesis: "Religious experi~ 
ence, at least for the Talmud, can only be primarily a moral experience" (p.15). 
And just as philosophical "systems" close off one's awareness of the existent, 
the Other who faces me, so the written text-even though it may be a trace of 
revelation-also hides/erases/occludes the original voice(s) that brought it to 
its present form. Every reading inevitably is selective, bringing some voices to 
the fore while necessarily pushing others into the shadows. 
22The citation on p. 28 of the text is incorrect. 
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Still, it is the reader's responsibility to overcome this occlusion of the-
Voice by seeking again and again the voices behind the text, 
The texts of the Oral Law that have been set into writing should never be sepa­
rated from their living commentary. When the voice of the exegetist no longer 
sounds-and who would dare believe it reverberates long in the ears of its lis­
teners-the texts return to their immobility, becoming once again enigmatic. 
strange, sometimes even ridiculously archaic. (pp. 13-14) 
Ira Stone puts it this way: 
If it is possible to recover what Levinas calls the "saying" behind the "said:' to re­
turn co the text as an oral tradition without abandoning the written form, to be 
in ,the presence of the original voices, then it is by way of asking questions. The 
dialectic-orality and the shakla ve-taryia, "question and answer;' -has been the 
age-old method of the study of the Talmud.24 
• • ~ .:::~.•_.~___ :0;..<.- -~ =-"'. 
The written text represents the "said," the letter that must be brought back 
to life by the "saying" of a community that wrestles its way back tb the voices 
behind the text, and adds its own diverse, never before heard, voices to the 
conversation as well. We. must be aware, however, that it is not only closed 
philosophical systems, "totalities;' that wreak viC?lence by denying the Other a 
separate existence. Our own hermeneutics also "wrestle" with the text, some­
times depend on "forced" interpretations and "apparent violences," which "rub" 
against the grain until blood flOWS!25 . 
23Walter BenJamin, Illuminations, crans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken, 1969), 
pp.256-57. 
24Ira F. Stone, Reading LevinaslReading Talmud (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication So­
ciety. 1998). p.,33. 
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